The 
Introduction
The United States of America (the US) has a relatively broad and adequate market abuse prohibition in place at a federal level. For instance, insider trading, market manipulation and other related illicit activities such as tipping and short selling 1 are regulated at a federal level in the US. This approach has to date relatively culminated in greater deterrence, compliance and curbing of market abuse practices across the US financial markets. 2 It is against this background that this article provides a brief overview analysis of the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse 3 prohibition in the US at a federal level. 4 This is done by, first, discussing the development, prohibition and the available penalties and remedies for insider trading. Secondly, a similar analysis will be done in respect of market manipulation. Moreover and where necessary, relevant federal provisions and cases from the US will be contrasted with similar provisions 5 and cases in South Africa in order to recommend, where appropriate, possible anti-market abuse measures that could be employed to enhance the combating of market abuse practices in South Africa. 6 The Securities Exchange Act was amended and introduced provisions that granted the SEC the authority to make rules that are appropriate and necessary 24 for the enforcement of the securities laws. 25 Therefore, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 26 which applied only in tender offer situations. Rule 14e-3 prohibited "any person who has obtained directly or indirectly, material confidential information" regarding a tender offer from the offeror (bidder), target company or an intermediary, to trade or tip another person to trade in that offer before making an adequate public disclosure of such information. Furthermore, a tippee who knew or should have known that such information had come from an insider was prohibited from trading with it until an adequate public disclosure was made. Rule 14e-3 applied to all persons (even juristic persons) but nevertheless it was not easily enforced in practice. Besides being a basis for some of the SEC's enforcement actions, Rule 14e-3 has been very difficult to enforce and in some instances it is confusingly interpreted to create an implied private action against the offenders. 27 Various shortcomings of the Securities Exchange Act led the Congress to enact the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 28 at the request of the SEC. This Act for the first time empowered the SEC to bring a civil action in the federal districts courts against persons who engage in insider trading activities. 29 Therefore, the SEC could impose civil penalties on anyone who practised insider trading through tipping or other related practices to pay an amount of up to three times the profit made or loss avoided for the benefit of all the persons who were prejudiced by it. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act further empowered the courts to impose a criminal penalty on any person who violated the insider trading provisions. 30 In spite of these developments, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act still failed to provide a lasting solution to the enforcement problems in the US. It did not expressly define insider trading and its provisions applied only to a few persons (primary insiders); other persons like "controlling persons" 31 were not specifically prohibited from committing insider trading offences. 32 In a bid to improve the regulation of insider trading, the Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. 33 This Act stipulated that public companies, broker-dealers and investment advisors should adopt appropriate policies to monitor and prohibit their employees from practising insider trading. 34 Moreover, the Securities Fraud Enforcement Act modified the wording of section 21A to make it clear that tippers could be liable for civil penalties when their tip resulted in insider trading, even if they are not technically aiders and abettors. 35 The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act broadened the treble penalty for insider trading 36 and further imposed liability on "controlling persons" for insider trading activities of their employees. 37 This Act also permitted the SEC to pay bounties to informants of up to 10% of the civil penalties recovered in order to promote and enhance the enforcement of insider trading in the US. 38 These bounties were not paid to members, officers or employees of federal regulatory agencies, Department of Justice and self-regulatory organisations. 39 The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act further empowered the SEC to investigate upon the request of similar regulatory bodies elsewhere any insider trading practices, regardless of whether such practices violated the SEC's federal insider trading laws. 40 In spite of the notable improvements brought by the Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, some persons were still able to contravene its insider trading provisions. For example,
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. 25 as a result of poor auditing and insider trading activities on the part of Enron's directors, its net income was reduced by $600 million and its debt increased to about $628 million. 41 In 2000, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act 42 was enacted to inter alia repeal the ban on single-stock futures, enhance the regulation futures exchanges and empower both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC) and the SEC to share the responsibility of regulating insider trading in the single-stock futures markets. 43 This Act, unlike the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 44 further enabled the CFTC to prohibit insider trading by discouraging market regulators' employees and other professionals like brokers from trading ahead of a client or other investors while in possession of non-public material information. 45 The aforementioned insider trading prohibition was, however, not extended to other persons who are not market professionals or employees per se. 46 In 48 This Act brought a more rigorous regulatory and enforcement structure for accounting companies and professionals to combat corporate fraud, insider trading and other market abuse practices. 49 For example, in order to prevent insider trading, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits employees (primary insiders) from trading in their company's stock relating to its pension plan funds during closed periods. 50 In the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the Congress recently enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 51 to inter alia enhance and broaden the SEC's ability to enforce insider trading and other securities laws. 52 For instance, this Act now allows the SEC and/or the CFTC to institute appropriate proceedings against any employee or agent of an agency or department of the federal government who purchases or sells a commodity while in possession of non-public material information which relates to that commodity. 53 In relation to this, the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the SEC to enforce the federal anti-fraud securities and insider trading prohibition extra-territorially. 54 The Dodd-Frank Act now provides incentives of up to 30% and immunity to whistleblowers who report insider trading and related violations to the SEC or the CFTC. 55 In contrast to the early developments of the regulation and enforcement of the insider trading ban in the US, 56 the legislature in South Africa only introduced a prohibition on insider trading in 1973. 57 Nonetheless, like the position in the US, 58 the South African regulatory framework also prohibits any person (including juristic persons) from practising insider trading and related activities like tipping. 59 For instance, the Financial Markets Act merely enumerates and prohibits four types of practices, namely, (a) dealing (directly or indirectly) in securities listed on a regulated market by an insider who knows that he has inside information which relates to such securities for his own personal benefit; 60 (b) dealing (directly or indirectly) in securities listed on a regulated market by an insider who knows that he has inside information which relates to such securities for the benefit of another person; 61 (c) improper disclosure of inside information to another person by an insider who knows that he has such information; 62 and (d) the encouraging or discouraging of another person by an insider, to deal in securities listed on a regulated market. 63 Despite these similarities, there is no express provision that prohibits dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter markets through agents in South Africa. 64 Over and above, unlike the situation in the US, 65 the Financial Markets Act does not expressly prohibit other related illicit activities such as naked short selling. 66 
Available Penalties for Insider Trading
The US's enforcement framework uses civil, criminal and administrative penalties to discourage insider trading. This can be traced back to the Securities Act of 1933 67 which provided that any person who contravened its provisions was criminally liable for a fine of $10 000, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both such fine and imprisonment. 68 Moreover, the Securities Exchange Act allows the SEC to impose any other appropriate administrative penalties on broker-dealers who involve themselves in insider trading practices. 69 As earlier stated, 70 the SEC was empowered to impose treble civil penalties on insider trading offenders for the profit made or loss avoided as a result of their illicit trading. 71 However, these sanctions were still insufficient for deterrence purposes and it was generally assumed that many persons benefited from insider trading without any fear of incurring liability. This might have been influenced by the fact that insider trading activity is inherently difficult to detect and enforce. 72 Additionally, the Congress introduced the Insider Trading Sanctions Act to improve inter alia the enforcement of the insider trading ban. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act imposed separate criminal penalties for natural and juristic persons. This Act further increased the criminal penalties for insider trading to a fine of $100 000 for natural persons and $500 000 for juristic persons. 73 The maximum imprisonment term for natural persons remained five years and the civil penalties were unchanged, in spite of the broad powers conferred upon the SEC to claim treble damages from the offenders. These penalties did not deter all persons from knowingly practising insider trading. It remained possible for some unscrupulous persons to benefit from their insider trading practices after paying the stipulated fine or after serving their imprisonment terms.
The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act was adopted and a further amendment especially to criminal sanctions was made in order to improve the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition. 74 The maximum criminal penalties were increased to a fine of $1 million for natural persons and to $2, 5 million for juristic persons. 75 Furthermore, the imprisonment sentence was significantly increased to a period not exceeding ten years. 76 Notably, the prior version of the criminal fines for insider trading applied only to matters relating to stock exchanges. 77 The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act enabled the SEC to continue paying bounty rewards to anyone who bona fide provided information leading to civil penalties in order to encourage all persons to expose insider trading activities. 78 The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act further expanded civil penalties to cover not only insiders or tippers, but also to apply to "controlling persons" to prevent potential insider trading and tipping by their employees. 79 In other words, this Act empowered the SEC to impose civil penalties on "controlling persons" who are not broker-dealers per se or investment advisors like banks, accounting firms and financial publishers. 80 Civil penalties imposed on "controlling persons" could differ to some extent from those that may be imposed on "controlled persons". 81 The civil or administrative penalties that could be imposed on "controlling persons" were generally limited to a fine not exceeding $1 million. 82 Furthermore, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 83 increased the insider trading sanctions to a maximum fine of $5 million for natural persons and up to $25 million for juristic persons and a maximum imprisonment sentence of 20 years. 84 The criminal sanctions and the civil remedies are enforced by the Department of Justice and the SEC respectively. This resulted in more successful criminal prosecutions and civil settlements to be obtained by the courts and the SEC respectively. 85 In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act empowered the SEC to recover monetary penalties in cease-and-desist administrative proceedings involving commodities or securities (including insider trading) violations. 86 Nonetheless, the Dodd-Frank Act does not have specific penalties for insider trading practices. 87 Notably, South Africa also provides for civil, 88 criminal 89 and unlimited administrative 90 penalties for insider trading under the Financial Markets Act. The aforesaid civil and unlimited administrative penalties are mainly enforced by the FSB 91 and the Enforcement Committee (the EC) 92 respectively. 93 Nevertheless, the Financial Markets Act only provides a few criminal penalties, namely, a fixed maximum fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment against the offenders. 94 Furthermore, no distinction has been made in relation to the penalties imposed on natural and juristic persons to increase deterrence. 95 In a nutshell, more may still need to be done to increase the successful investigation, prosecution and settlement of insider trading cases in South Africa. 96 
S 78(2)(a) read with subsection (3)(a) & s 82. 62 S 78(4)(a). 63 S 78(5). 64 Put differently, although the current South African insider trading ban has extra-territorial application, it is mainly limited to securities listed on a regulated market in South Africa or elsewhere. Moreover, this extra-territorial application is still to be successfully enforced in South Africa and/or elsewhere because it is, inter alia, not restricted to instances where a territorial link is present by virtue either of the fact that the offender is at the time physically present in South Africa, or was acting through an agent who is in South Africa
Available Remedies for Insider Trading
One of the most far reaching insider trading regulatory developments in the US is the availability of a wide range of remedies to all the affected persons. 97 For example, a private right of action is available to contemporaneous purchasers or sellers of securities against insider trading offenders. 98 The affected persons may claim damages not exceeding the profit gained or loss avoided by the defendant (offender) or his tippees. 99 It is clear that tippers and tippees are jointly and severally liable for insider trading damages. 100 Nevertheless, any losses incurred or amounts used in a SEC injunction action relating to any civil penalty transaction for contemporaneous traders are deducted from the damages recovered. 101 No limit or condition is imposed on any person who brings an action to enforce the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act or on the availability of any implied right of action under the same Act. 102 In addition, the SEC can bring a judicial enforcement action seeking a court order that enjoins insiders or tippees from indulging in insider trading activity and that mandates them to return or disgorge all the profits gained or losses avoided. 103 Another remedy available in the US is the civil action for recovery or compensation for "defrauded" owners of nonpublic confidential information. Such persons are statutorily allowed to take a private action against any persons who practise insider trading and other similar activities. 104 The entities like companies are also allowed to recover any losses suffered as a result of insider trading from the offenders. 105 There is no explicit statutory limitation that applies to the period on which private actions may be instituted under Rule 10b-5. Instead, the courts have been required to determine the appropriate limitation periods on private civil actions giving regard to any other relevant factors. 106 The SEC may also claim treble civil damages from any person who violates its insider trading rules. 107 These damages, like any other remedies, are usually paid into the federal treasury. It is possible for offenders to disgorge their profits in a private or SEC action and still pay a treble damage penalty without any concerns of double jeopardy violation. 108 The Dodd-Frank Act further allows the SEC to pay bounty rewards to whistle-blowers who report insider trading and related violations that results in the successful disgorgement of profits, monetary penalties and prejudgment interest exceeding $1 million in any judicial or administrative proceedings. 109 Similarly, as is the position in the US, 110 the enforcement of the civil remedies and penalties in South Africa is mainly a responsibility of an independent board, the FSB. 111 However, administrative remedies are generally administered by the EC, which is a committee of the FSB. For instance, the EC may impose against the insider trading offender, an administrative sanction not exceeding the profit made or loss avoided by that offender. 112 Moreover, the Financial Markets Act also provides compensatory damages for an amount of up to three times the profit made or loss avoided by the offender, 113 to those prejudiced by insider trading activities. Thus, any person affected by insider trading activities may institute a claim for part of the proceeds and/or compensatory damages from the FSB under the Financial Markets Act. 114 Moreover, the Financial Markets Act now allows the affected persons to claim extra compensatory damages proceeds for an amount of up to R1 million 115 from the FSB. 116 Likewise, insider trading victims may also recover part of the proceeds obtained by the FSB from the offenders, in relation to any interests, investigation costs, legal costs and commission 117 as determined by the EC under the Financial Markets Act. 118 The Financial Markets Act also provides actual calculable damages which may be utilised by those who fall victim to insider trading practices. 119 However, unlike the position in the US, 120 the Financial Markets Act does not provide any new measures or statutory guidelines that could be employed by the EC and/or the claims officer when determining the actual calculable damages that will be given to the affected persons. 121 Furthermore, the Financial Markets Act's insider trading remedies are still very few, and they could also be less dissuasive for deterrence purposes. 122 For instance, unlike the situation in the US, 123 other alternative remedies such as specific civil pecuniary penalties, punitive damages, bounty rewards, class actions and private rights of action are not expressly provided under the Financial Markets Act. 124
Prohibition on Market Manipulation
Prohibition on Trade-Based and Disclosure-Based Market Manipulation
Although the concept of market abuse is not expressly and statutorily defined in the US, 125 the regulation and prohibition of market abuse practices can be linked back to the so-called "New Deal" legislation that was enacted after a heavy crash occurred in its stock markets in 1929. 126 The most important "New Deal legislation" was the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.
The Securities Act prohibits the making of corporate misstatements that will lead to the defrauding of innocent investors. 127 This is mainly done to protect investors against corporate false or misleading statements in the context of new issues and to safeguard the adequate and continuous flow of issuer-specific information. 128 In addition, the Securities Exchange Act expressly prohibits market manipulation. This Act, for instance, prohibits any person from willingly creating misleading appearances of active trading in securities listed on a stock exchange. 129 Put differently, the Securities Exchange Act discourages and prohibits a number of activities that create or that might create a misleading appearance of trading in listed securities like wash sales and matched orders (when the same person or affiliate is essentially both the buyer and the seller of the securities in question), a series of transactions to induce the purchase or sale by others and the false or reckless "touting" or spreading of rumours by broker-dealers or other traders to induce trading in such securities. 130 The Securities Exchange Act further prohibits any person from directly or indirectly using manipulative and other deceptive devices to purchase or sell any listed securities to the detriment of investors. 131 In addition, any such persons who violate the rules and regulations proscribed by the SEC will also be liable for an offence. 132 In relation to this, the SEC is authorised to make any other appropriate rules and regulations to combat market manipulation in the US. 133 The SEC introduced a rule that discourages any person from employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud or to engage in an act, practice or course of business that will deceive other persons. 134 This rule further prohibits all persons from making untrue and misleading statements relating to the material facts of any securities. 135 
See s 82(2)(e). 118 See s 82(1)(c) & (d); (2)(c) & (d). 119 See s 82(6)(a) and (b). 120 See related analysis above. 121 See further s 82(6)(a) & (b) read with subsection (5)(b
S 9(a). Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation 266. 130 S 9(a). 131 S 10(b) read with subsection (a). See further Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494; Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104. 132 S 9(b) & (c) read with subsection (a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 133 For example the United States Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5 in order to effectively enforce the provisions of s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See further Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104. 134 See Rule 10b-5 which prohibits three types of market manipulation, namely false dissemination of material information relating to securities, distortion and misleading behaviour and the use of manipulative devices that negatively affect the price of securities and create a false appearance in the market activity. Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation 316-317 & Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse (2009) 132. 135 Rule 10b-5. Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation 306; 308-309.
Moreover, the SEC introduced Regulation M 136 which, among other aspects, prohibits market manipulation during a public distribution (public offering of securities) and allows price-stabilisation activities only in some specific circumstances. The SEC further adopted Rule 10a-1 (the so-called up-tick rule) to prevent market manipulation and free falls in stock prices due to short selling in a falling market. 137 This rule has been criticised as too narrow because it did not cover short sales and other manipulative activities in over the counter markets and in sales of derivatives. Regulation SHO was then enacted to combat naked short selling and market manipulation in all the US's financial markets and in broker-dealer transactions. 138 The Securities Exchange Act further prohibits the making of false or misleading statements of any material fact or engagement in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices in connection with tender offers. 139 Additionally, the Securities Exchange Act allowed the SEC to define "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices" and to make appropriate rules designed to prevent such manipulative practices. 140 This Act does not expressly prohibit market manipulation in over the counter markets. 141 In an effort to avoid the recurrence of corporate scandals 142 and to reassure investors that the US financial markets will be free from market abuse practices, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted. 143 This Act prohibits any person (including a juristic person) or employee from engaging in an act or practice that will improperly influence the conduct of audits or the falsification of books, records and accounts. 144 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further prohibits senior officers of a company from selling stocks during certain pension "black-out" periods if they received that stock as compensation during their employment with the company in question in order to prevent possible market abuse activities like insider trading and market manipulation. 145 Additionally, the SEC enacted a specific rule that prohibits officers, directors and persons acting under their direction from knowingly coercing, manipulating, misleading or fraudulently influencing the auditor of the issuer's financial statements. 146 Interestingly, the Financial Markets Act, like its US counterpart, the Securities Exchange Act, prohibits any person from knowingly engaging or participating in trade-based market manipulation practices that interfere with the normal market mechanisms of supply and demand for securities. 147 Notably, the Financial Markets Act employs the term "knowingly" in its trade-based market manipulation provision 148 and this could imply that proof of intention is mandatorily required before any liability can be imposed upon the offenders. Furthermore, the Financial Markets Act's disclosurebased market manipulation provisions, 149 like similar provisions in the US, 150 prohibit all persons from making or publishing false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises or forecasts that relate to any security. 151 Nonetheless, the Financial Markets Act does not expressly prohibit a person who inadvertently aided or abetted another person to make or publish a false, misleading or deceptive statement, promise or forecast that relate to any security. 152 For instance, where a printing company inadvertently aided or abetted an offender by ignorantly printing and/or publishing his misleading or deceptive materials pertaining to listed securities, to the detriment of other uninformed investors. In other 137 Palmiter Securities Regulation 268-269. 138 Palmiter Securities Regulation 269. 139 words, it was inter alia held in Central Bank of Denver NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver NA 153 that the words "directly or indirectly" do not apply to secondary actors who are not directly involved in market manipulation practices like aiders and abettors. Therefore, if we are to follow the approach employed in this case, the words "directly or indirectly" as stated in the Financial Markets Act's disclosure-based market manipulation provisions 154 could be interpreted to exclude aiders and abettors.
17 CFR, s 241.100-240.105 (2007). The SEC normally relies on its wide powers as conferred by s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See further Palmiter Securities Regulation 267-268 & Hazen Federal Securities Law 89-91.
S 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. 140 For example the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 to enhance the enforcement of the provisions of s 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act and a number of measures that discourage market manipulation were introduced. Rule 14e-3(a) & (d). Also see Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law
Prohibition on Commodity Market Manipulation
Market manipulation with respect to commodities futures and other kinds of derivatives is principally regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act. 155 Thus, the CFTC, and not the SEC, is the main regulatory body that deals with the enforcement of commodity market manipulation in the US. 156 Actual or attempted market manipulation of any commodity or future or option is prohibited under the Commodity Exchange Act as amended. 157 Consequently, any conduct or practice that results in the misleading of investors and the creation of an artificial price of commodities is prohibited. 158 The Commodity Exchange Act further prohibits intentional aiding, abetting and inducement of other persons to commit market manipulation offences. 159 Under this Act, the CFTC could bring a civil action or any other appropriate action against the offenders if it has a reason to believe that such offenders have a specific intent to create an artificial price or to influence the price of the commodities or that an artificial price that exists has been caused by their manipulative practices. 160 The Commodities Futures Modernization Act prohibits commodities-based market manipulation in the single-stock futures markets and over the counter derivative transactions. 161 Accordingly, under this Act both the CFTC and the SEC have the authority to institute appropriate proceedings against any person who commits market manipulation and other related activities. 162 Notably, the SEC's authority is only limited to violations relating to single-stock futures transactions, not "broad-based" security futures transactions which are exclusively covered by the CFTC. 163 Nonetheless, if there is a rule violation or market manipulation in the sale or purchase of a single-stock future, either the CFTC or the SEC may, after consultation, bring an enforcement action against the offenders. 164 Recently, the Dodd-Frank Act broadened the authority of the CFTC to make appropriate rules 165 and prohibit both trade-based market manipulation and disclosure-based market manipulation practices. 166 In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act introduced the prohibition on fraud-based market manipulation practices in relation to any purchase or sale of a swap or commodity contract in interstate commerce or for future delivery and/or subject to the rules of any registered entity. 167 The Dodd-Frank Act further introduced a broad prohibition on direct or indirect swap or commodity-based market manipulation as well as attempted swap or commodity-based market manipulation. 168 Unlike the status quo in the US, 169 the Financial Markets Act does not have provisions that specifically prohibit commodity-based market manipulation in South Africa. 170 Apparently, commodity-based market manipulation practices are prohibited and enforced by both the JSE and the FSB. Nonetheless, in contrast with the CFTC, 171 it remains to be 153 (1994) (2006) 192-194. 159 seen whether the JSE and the FSB will consistently increase the prohibition and surveillance of commodity-based market manipulation practices in South Africa. 172 Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the FSB prohibits Internet-based market manipulation activities. For instance, unlike the SEC, the FSB does not have a specific unit that prohibits Internet-based market abuse activities. 173 
1398). Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 106. 157 S 9(a)(2). 158 All persons are prohibited from entering into or confirming the execution of a transaction that is misleading in nature (wash sales) to create a fictitious sale of any commodities, see s 4(c). Also see Swan Market Abuse Regulation
Ss 13(a); 6(c) to (d) & 9(a)(2); also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104. 160 Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104; Swan Market Abuse
Available Penalties for Market Manipulation
A variety of penalties such as criminal, civil and administrative sanctions are used to combat market manipulation practices in the US. The Securities Act imposes criminal penalties of up to five years imprisonment and a $10 000 fine on any person who knowingly violates its anti-fraud and market manipulation provisions. 174 Furthermore, the Securities Exchange Act imposes a maximum criminal penalty fine of $100 000, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both on natural persons who wilfully engage in prohibited trade practices and other related market manipulation offences. 175 The Securities Exchange Act further imposes a separate fine not exceeding $5 million, or imprisonment for a period of up to 20 years on individuals as well as a $25 million fine for juristic persons (companies and other entities) that intentionally engage in disclosure-based market manipulation and other related practices. 176 This distinction is believed to have been made to increase deterrence and improve the general enforcement of the market abuse provisions in the US. 177 Importantly, both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act criminalised false and misleading registration statements and the filing of misleading documents with the SEC respectively. 178 With regard to civil penalties, the Securities Exchange Act has empowered the SEC to impose civil penalties on any person who wilfully or recklessly aided, abetted, counseled, commanded or induced another person to commit market abuse practices like filing false and misleading documents with the SEC. 179 Although there is no explicit provision for a civil penalty for the contravention of Rule 10b-5, a private right of action for such contravention is available to all prejudiced actual purchasers and sellers of securities on the basis of equity. 180 In relation to administrative penalties, the SEC is further authorised to administer and impose unlimited administrative penalties upon the market manipulation offenders. It may issue a refusal or stop order (cease and desist orders) to prevent an already existing registration statement from being effective or to stop the filing of a false or misleading statement. 181 The SEC may also claim the disgorgement of any profits made by a person who violates the securities and market abuse provisions. 182 In addition, the SEC may impose a judicial order for civil monetary penalties on the alleged offenders if it reasonably believes that such penalties will be in the public interest. 183 On the other hand, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act provides criminal penalties against any commodities-based market manipulation offenders in the single-stock futures markets, over the counter commodities derivatives and other related markets in the US. Similarly, the Commodity Exchange Act imposes a criminal penalty fine of up to $100 000 on individuals and up to $500 000 on entities that indulge in fraudulent and/or other prohibited commodities-based market manipulation practices. Individuals could also be liable to imprisonment for up to five years, or both such fine and imprisonment. 184 In addition, the Commodity Exchange Act imposes civil penalties against any commodities-based market manipulation offenders. This Act allows the CFTC to take appropriate civil action against any persons who aids, abets, counsels, induces or procures the commission of market manipulation offences. 185 The CFTC may, therefore, claim any disgorgement profits and civil monetary penalties of up to $1 million or three times the profits gained by offenders and distribute them to the affected persons. 186 Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced significantly higher criminal penalties for market manipulation and other related offences. It imposes a maximum criminal fine of $5 million and imprisonment sentence of up to 20 years for individuals. 187 A separate maximum criminal fine not exceeding $25 million is also imposed on entities that are involved in market manipulation and other related activities. 188 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further provides civil penalties against any person who knowingly executes or attempts to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud or to manipulate by means of false pretenses, representations or promises, any money or property in connection with the securities of a public company. 189 This suggests that there is an attempted market manipulation offence in the US. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act permits the SEC to seek civil compensatory penalties against any person who presents manipulative, fraudulent, false or misleading statements with regard to the conduit of audits, books, records and accounts of a company. 190 The SEC may impose other civil and administrative penalties necessary to enforce and discourage market manipulation activities. 191 As is the position in the US, 192 the Financial Markets Act also imposes criminal 193 and unlimited administrative 194 penalties against any person who indulges in trade-based market manipulation 195 and disclosure-based market manipulation 196 practices in South Africa. These criminal and unlimited administrative penalties are generally enforced by the courts and the EC 197 respectively. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, 198 the Financial Markets Act still imposes a few and minimal criminal penalties of a fixed maximum fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment 199 against the market manipulation offenders. Unlike the position in the US, relatively few investigations 200 and criminal prosecutions involving market manipulation cases have been obtained in the relevant courts in South Africa to date. 201 As previously indicated, 202 this could be aggravated by the fact that the Financial Markets Act does not impose sufficient, separate and distinct criminal penalties against the natural and juristic persons that commit market manipulation offences to increase deterrence. 203 Moreover, the Financial Markets Act does not expressly provide civil penalties for market manipulation offences. 204 This flaw could be negatively affecting the curbing of market manipulation practices in South Africa, 205 compared to similar foreign legislation in countries like the US.
Additionally, unlike the situation in the US, 206 little or no consideration was given to the introduction of specific civil penalties for commodities-based market manipulation practices in South Africa. 207 Moreover, although it appears that the enforcement of the commodities-based market manipulation ban vests with both the FSB and the JSE, not many settlements involving such cases have been obtained in the South African courts to date. 208 It is not clear whether the FSB and the JSE have the statutory authority to impose their own civil penalties and appropriate rules to prevent commodity-based market manipulation. Furthermore, neither the Protection of Funds Act nor the Financial Markets Act has a statutory provision that expressly empowers the EC to make or enact its own rules to enhance the combating of market manipulation practices in South Africa. 209
Available Remedies for Market Manipulation
A wide range of remedies such as criminal, civil and administrative remedies are available to all the persons affected by market manipulation in the US. Apart from these remedies, a private right of action, damages, injunctions, disciplinary sanctions and suspension orders may be employed by the victims of market manipulation to recover their losses from the offenders.
Criminal remedies may be obtained from any person who contravenes market manipulation provisions or the SEC rules, including the making of a false or misleading statement in a filing submitted to the SEC. 210 If the offenders refuse or delay to pay up their fines, the SEC will refer such cases to the Department of Justice for further criminal prosecution. 211 In addition, a statutory derivative civil remedy for market manipulation violations is permitted in the US on grounds of equity. 212 The SEC may, therefore, claim disgorgement of profits and other civil compensatory remedies from any person who contravenes its rules or other market manipulation provisions. 213 Likewise, the CFTC may institute court orders for civil monetary fines, restitution, disgorgement of profits, rescission and actual damages against any commodities-based market manipulation offenders. 214 The SEC and the CFTC are further empowered to take appropriate administrative action against any persons who violate the relevant market manipulation provisions in the US. In relation to this, the SEC may issue cease and desist orders compelling any alleged offenders to stop or refrain from violating its market abuse rules. 215 If the alleged offender fails to comply with the cease and desist order, the SEC may enforce the order in a federal court. 216 Furthermore, the SEC may impose a compliance order with regard to any misleading tender offer statements or where a registrant's filing is defective, manipulative or misleading. 217 The SEC can further suspend trading and offering of securities traded publicly for up to ten days pending a hearing. 218 In line with this, the SEC can take disciplinary action against broker-dealers and other persons who contravene the market abuse provisions. 219 permanent injunction orders against persistent commodities-based market manipulation offenders. 220 As stated earlier, 221 a private right of action is available to all the persons who are prejudiced by market manipulation, insider trading and other related practices to claim their damages directly from the offenders. 222 For instance, any prejudiced person may have a private right of action against brokers, exchanges and related organisations that commit commodities-based market manipulation offences. Nonetheless, where the costs of bringing such action are too high, the CFTC may claim remedies on behalf of the prejudiced persons. 223 It is possible that the offenders who engage in trade-based or disclosure-based market manipulation and/or commodities-based market manipulation may be subjected to the SEC or CFTC action as well as another private action from the actual prejudiced persons. 224 In contrast to the position in the US, 225 there are no specific civil remedies for commodities-based and other related forms of market manipulation practices that are provided in the Financial Markets Act. 226 In other words, the Financial Markets Act falls short when it comes to the statutory provision and policing of commodities-based market manipulation remedies in South Africa. 227 On the other hand, the EC may recover administrative damages from the trade-based and/or disclosure-based market manipulation offenders in terms of the Protection of Funds Act. 228 However, the Financial Markets Act does not expressly empower the EC to provide civil monetary administrative remedies and/or sanctions to compensate persons who fall victim to market manipulation. 229 As a result, the EC is currently able to bring only a few administrative actions such as compensatory orders, cost orders and disciplinary orders against the market manipulation offenders. 230 Furthermore, there is no express statutory provision for a private right of action for market manipulation victims in South Africa. 231 
Concluding Remarks
It is clear that both the US, at a federal level, 232 and South Africa 233 have market abuse legislation which mainly discourages insider trading and market manipulation. However, as earlier stated, 234 the prohibitions, penalties and remedies for market abuse in the US are relatively broader than those available in South Africa. For instance, unlike the position in the US, 235 Internet-based and commodities-based market manipulation practices are not expressly outlawed in South Africa, especially under the Financial Markets Act. 236 Furthermore, the Financial Markets Act still does not impose sufficient, separate and distinct criminal penalties against the natural and juristic persons that commit market abuse offences in South Africa. 237 Over and above, other alternative remedies such as specific civil pecuniary penalties, punitive Van 
